

Radikale Philosophie und Ästhetik: Der
französische Moment der Philosophie, 6 /
Ausgangspunkte für eine philosophische Ästhetik
auf der Höhe der Gegenwart, 1
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Frieder Otto Wolf
Institut für Philosophie, Freie Universität
Berlin

www.friederottowolf.de

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Zur Debatte zwischen Badiou und Rancière (nachgeholt)

- Der „Einsatz“ der Debatte
- Badiou's Thesen
- Rancière's Kritik
- Shaws Antikritik
- F. O. Wolfs Kommentare

-> Devin Zane Shaw: Inaesthetics and Truth: The Debate between Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière, *Filozofski vestnik*, 38 (2007), H. 2, 183-199
[pdf unter < <https://ojs.zrc-sazu.si/filozofski-vestnik/article/view/3182> >]

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Der „Einsatz“ der Debatte

- Pedagogical: relation to Althusser
- Philosophical: thinking the radical possibility of egalitarian politics
Badiou's Thesen
- Political: disrupting the logic of the police-state
- Aesthetic: taking positions on art

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Badiou's Thesen, 1

Badiou's central concerns (besides ontology): the novelty of the event / the subject's fidelity to the truth of an event

- The event of truth
- Effects of subjectification
- The four conditions of philosophy:
 - Science
 - Art
 - Politics
 - Love

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Badiou's Thesen, 2a

The event of truth:

„An event breaks with the state of the situation, and reconfigures the co-ordinates of the symbolic order“

„an event takes no object“: „every truth is without an object“

„art precedes the origins of philosophy“

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Badiou's Thesen, 2b

Three schemata tying together art, philosophy, and the theme of education

Each with a historical and a contemporary manifestation

(1) Didactic banishment and instrumental use of art_

- Plato's didactic schema - ostracizing art's „charm of the semblance of truth“
- Brecht's ‚Stalinized Platonism‘: „art is the pedagogical tool for the courage of truth“

(2) The romantic schema:

- „art alone is capable of truth“, a truth „philosophy can only point to“ – reinstating the communitarian bond of Greek antiquity in modern Germany“ (-> Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus, von Hölderlin, Hegel und Schelling)
- Heidegger on Hölderlin: His work could still „confront the Germans as a test to be stood“, in: *Ursprung des Kunstwerks*)

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Badiou's Thesen, 2b

(3) The classical schema: Aristotle's two theses

a) „art is mimetic, its regime is that of semblance“

b) „the purpose of art is neither truth, nor pedagogy, but therapy“

-> art's mimetic effects provide the possibility of catharsis, defined by Badiou as „the deposition of the passions in a transference into semblance“

-> art becomes „a kind of escape mechanism for social pressures“

The psychoanalytic interpretation of „art as the manifestation of desire ... activates the classical schema“

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Badiou's Thesen, 2c

The problem of the avant-gardes of the 20th century – missing from these schemata

Badiou: „hybrid and unstable entanglement of the didactic and romantic schema“ - oscillating „between the attempt to exhaust art of its alienated or alienating character“ and that „to realize the absolute legibility of art's absolute and separate character“ -> ‚aesthetic voluntarism‘

„inaesthetics“ as „a novel modality of the relation between art and philosophy“:

- The *immanent* relation of art to truth: truth is internal to art's effects
- The *singular* relation of art to truth: it belongs to art and cannot „circulate among other registers of work-producing thought“

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Badiou's Thesen, 2d

Schemata	Pedagogical role	Truth	Relation art/truth
Didactic	Yes	No	Singular/not immanent
Romantic	No	Yes	Not singular/immanent
Classic	Yes	No	Not singular/not immanent
Inaesthetic	Yes	Yes	Singular/Immanent

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Badiou's Thesen, 2e

The novel position of inaesthetics: affirming the singularity and immanence of the relation between art and truth

- Beyond / below the familiar dichotomy of subject and object:
 - „artistic configuration“: a sequence of works which proceed from an event (no „absolute works“)
 - „subject-point“: the work of art is thought as a subject-point of an objective truth, subject-points are articulated as a sequence of works in fidelity to an event (no „genius“)

„a truth is an artistic configuration initiated by an event [...] and unfolded through chance in the form of works that serve as its subject points“
(Handbook of Inaesthetics, 12)

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Badiou's Thesen, 3

- Effects of subjectification, induced by events:

„For each event, or truth (as truths are multiple), a subject must make a wager. After deciding in favor of an event, that is has taken place, this subject proceeds in fidelity to this truth, to ‚make sense‘ of it.“

Psychoanalytic discourse – interpreting art as the manifestation of desire – activates the classical schema: „The work of art makes it possible to inscribe the object of desire, ..., in the Symbolic, thus breaking the impasse of the Real“

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Badiou's Thesen, 4

- The four conditions of philosophy:
 - Science
 - Art
 - Politics
 - Love

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Badiou's Thesen, 5

Summing up:

„1. Artistic events take no object. The work of art is not the object of an event. However, an artistic event submits art to a principle of novelty.

2. The novelty of the event is registered in the sequence of works as subject-points. New configurations will have taken place insofar as they are unprecedented within a previous state of the situation.

3. The truths of artistic events are thought from within the condition of art. This is the second implication of the intransitivity of events.

Philosophy does not name the truth of a configuration, but registers the novel truths of art.“

Inästhetik und Wahrheit: Badiou's Thesen, 6

Summing up, continued:

„truth is localized in artistic procedures, which circulate between configurations and differential subject-points, constrained by a post-evental rupture with the state of the situation“

Educational link between art and philosophy: „‘the only education is an education *by* truths. The intire, insistent problem is that there be truths, without which the philosophical category of truth is entirely empty and the philosophical act nothing but an academic quibble““

(Handbook of Inaesthetics, 14f.)

Inästhetik und Wahrheit, II: Rancières Gegenposition und Kritik, 1

Rancière's conception of the relation between aesthetics of politics and the „politics of aesthetics“

Rancière's critique of Badiou's „inaesthetics“:

Three processes through which inaesthetics confront „the equivocations of the homonymy of art“ („Aesthetics, Inaesthetics, Anti-aesthetics“ in: Peter Halward, hg., *Think again. Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy*, New York 2004, 231):

- „inaesthetics' names the operations that dissociate the logic of art's aesthetic regime, through which the ‚Platonism of the multiple' is constructed as the thought of art“ (loc. cit., 231)
- „'inaesthetics' designates the twisted necessity whereby those dividing lines through which the Platonism of truths hides its affinity with aesthetic Platonism come to coincide with the dividing lines through which modernism seeks to guarantee that which is ‚proper to art' against aesthetic indistinction“ (loc. cit., 231)

Inästhetik und Wahrheit, II: Rancières Gegenposition und Kritik, 2

- „perhaps“ inaesthetics undermines the other two processes: It “designates the movement whereby the attempt to delimit the places of art, to delimit what is not-yet-art and distinguish between art/non-art, [which] undermines the very end it was supposed to secure and releases what it was supposed to shut away by retying art to non-art and to the discourse on art”

Inästhetik und Wahrheit, II: Rancières Gegenposition und Kritik, 3

Rancière's later critique, 1

„It does not seem that inaesthetics, such as Badiou understands it, goes in this direction. The “Manifesto of Affirmationism,” which represents the current synthesis of his vision of art, shows him to be more concerned with reaffirming a “propriety of art” submitted to the educational vision that he confers on it. In this way, inaesthetics can only encounter the dominant antinomy of modernism. This antinomy is simple to formulate: the more the propriety of art is accentuated, the more this “propriety” tends to be assimilated to an experience of a radical heterogeneity, whose ultimate model is the shock of the encounter with the God who disconcerts Paul or speaks to Moses from out of the cloud. As the Manifesto affirms, “Art which is and which comes must be as solidly linked as a demonstration, as surprising as a stroke of night, and as elevated as a star.””

Inästhetik und Wahrheit, II: Rancières Gegenposition und Kritik, 3

Rancière's later critique, 2

“Assuredly, this formulation is anything but rhetorical approximation. It points exemplarily to the heart of Badiou's problematic: the double transformation of the revolutionary cut in the Lacanian encounter with the face of the Gorgon and the encounter with the Gorgon in the Platonic call of the Ideal. To pose the identity between art which is and which must be, it is necessary to make art the pure experience of the imperative dictated by the violent encounter with the Other. On this point, the Platonic strike of the Idea affirmed by inaesthetics is in accord with the commandment of the Other claimed by the aesthetics of the sublime. Both isolate art from aesthetics only to incline it toward ethical indistinction.” (*Malaise dans l'esthétique*, 17f.)

Inästhetik und Wahrheit, III: Shaws Gegenposition, 1

- Concept of the Other: Lyotard/Lévinas or Lacan
 - Separate the Big Other and the Real
 - The Lacanian Other, strictly speaking, does not exist
 - The Other of Lévinas: ethics of the Other (-> conforming „to democratic consensus and the nullification of politics proper“)
 - Badiou's „infinity is not the transcendental power of God, but the ‚banal reality of every situation‘“
- Concern with the ‚propriety of art‘ in inaesthetics, but this does not exhaust the effects of art, extending beyond the domain of inaesthetics
 - > art need not be thought in connection to ‚political lessons‘, but if it is, it is thought outside of the domain of politics

Inästhetik und Wahrheit, III: Shaws Gegenposition, 2

„1 . Rancière is correct to accuse inaesthetics of maintaining a propriety of art. [...]

2. Artistic events follow a principle of novelty or rupture. [...]

3. Finally, a critique of Rancière: is there not a problem with attaching the politics of dissensus (which is possible in any political regime presupposing the egalitarian principle) to a particular historical regime, namely the aesthetic regime of art? [...]"

-> „By separating artistic truths and political truths, Badiou avoids this historicist impasse. Instead of tracing the relationship between events and historical regimes, Badiou offers us the conceptual tools to distinguish how events, whether artistic or political, stand out from their time.“

Inästhetik und Wahrheit, IV: Meine Kommentare, 1

- Die Frage der Vollständigkeit der Schemata: Die Dimension der Relevanz von Wahrheiten in Kunst (absolut), Wissenschaft (instrumentell) und Philosophie (relativ)
- Lacans Sackgasse / Lévinas' problematischer Optimismus / der Ausweg einer mutigen Skepsis in der radikalen Philosophie
- Selbstbeschränkung der radikalen Philosophie als sekundäre Tätigkeit
- Wahrheitspolitik und Ästhetik
- Die doppelte Bestimmtheit der Ästhetik in von Herrschaftsstrukturen bestimmten modernen Gesellschaften

Inästhetik und Wahrheit, IV: Meine Kommentare, 2

- „Il n'y a pas d'amour heureux!“
- Die Praxis der Ästhetik angesichts der Unmöglichkeit von Befreiung und Glück
- Der Ereignisbezug von Ästhetik
- Radikale Philosophie in finsternen Zeiten: Anerkennung der Gründe für die gegenwärtige Unmöglichkeit und Erarbeitung einer grundsätzlichen, zunächst utopisch erscheinenden Perspektive ihrer Wiedergewinnung Artikulation des ‚Prinzips Hoffnung‘ (Ernst Bloch)
- die Doppelrolle der Ästhetik – in herrschaftsbestimmten Gesellschaften die Perspektive der Befreiung vergegenwärtigen und in befreiten Gesellschaften das freie Spiel der menschlichen Möglichkeiten zur Erzielung von Sinneffekten offen zu halten
- Dauerhafte „glückliche Liebe“ für alle in befreiten Verhältnissen?